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This longitudinalstudy analyzes the impact of labormarket conditions and
welfare policies accompanying the 1990s waivers granted by the federal
government to Californiaand the 1996 PersonalResponsibility and Work
OpportunityAct (PRWOA) on families entering welfare (accessions). A
time series model was specifiedfor analyzing the numberof families entering welfarefrom January1983 to December 1998. The findings suggest that
in 1998 under PRWOA, all else constant, there were fewer case openings.
Priorto the PRWOA, policy shifts of the 1990s did not have an impact
on case openings. The findings also show that under economic recovery
fewer families applied for welfare. The implications of these findings are
that drastic measures such as time-limited welfare should be re-examined
since a favorable economic environment allows many recipients to remain
off public assistanceeven in the absence of such measures.
In the last few years, the number of families on welfare,
commonly referred to as the welfare caseload, has plunged nationwide while federal financing for welfare has remained fixed.
This has left states with large amounts of unspent federal monies.
Between 1997 and 1999, welfare caseloads dropped from 5.0 to 3.1
million cases. A recent article in the New York Times attributes
this significant drop to welfare reform strategies taken by the
states and by the federal government.
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Nationwide, in 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act (PRWOA, PL 104-193) was signed into law.
This legislation replaced the federal entitlement program of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Since the passage of the
Social Security Act in 1935, the AFDC program, commonly known
as welfare, provided cash assistance to poor families with children, mainly female-headed families, who met categorical and
income eligibility criteria. Under the PRWOA, each state replaced
its AFDC program with a time-limited cash assistance program.
In 1998, California's AFDC program was replaced by California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs).
Along with its time limits, this new program implemented substantial work-related requirements and incentives.
Prior to the inception of PRWOA, welfare caseloads began
decreasing nationwide. Several studies attribute much of this
decline to economic recovery and, to a lesser degree, to states'
policy initiatives (Albert, 2000; Council of Economic Advisors,
1997; Blank, 1997). In the mid 1990s, when caseloads began decreasing dramatically, California, as in many other states, was
granted waivers by the federal government which allowed the
state to provide welfare recipients with additional work incentives and work-related activities. As occurred in most other states,
California's welfare caseload began to decrease in the mid-1990s,
when the state was experimenting with welfare reform initiatives
and when it began experiencing economic recovery. California's
welfare caseload continued to decrease after it implemented CalWORKs in 1998.
In general, declines in welfare caseloads are in response to
decreases in the number of families entering the rolls and to
increases in the number of families leaving the rolls. Such movements are frequently referred to in the literature as welfare accessions and terminations, respectively. According to theory and
related earlier research, welfare policies and the economy are
expected to have different effects on welfare accessions and terminations. In light of the goals of the 1996 PRWOA federal welfare
legislation and the goals of earlier 1990s welfare initiatives taken
by states, it is particularly important to determine if, and the
extent to which, welfare policies of the 1990s and the economy
played a role in changing the number of families entering the

FutureReforms

7

welfare rolls. Welfare policies can deter eligible families from
applying for welfare. The economy can also play an important
role in shaping families' decisions to enter welfare. In turn, when
welfare policies are designed, there is a need to consider the
potential joint effects of the economy and welfare policies on
families' decisions to enter welfare.
California's very severe recession in the 1990s and subsequent vigorous recovery occurred in the midst of its waivers and
CalWORKs, creating an excellent domain for teasing apart the
impact of policy shifts from the economy on changing welfare
accessions or terminations. The present longitudinal aggregate
study determines the extent to which earlier waivers and the
PRWOA as implemented by CalWORKs affected the number of
families entering the welfare rolls in California. A special value of
studying the effects of a policy by using a time-series approach is
that policy effects on those who are targeted for the program and
on those who are not targeted for the program can be discerned.
The largest component of the welfare caseload, the AFDC-Family
Groups (AFDC-FG) or CalWORKs component is considered for
analysis. This component mainly serves single parent families,
many of whom do not have labor force experience.
This study's findings should have nationwide relevance because the relationships between welfare policy or the economy
with welfare receipt are of national concerns. Moreover, California has about 12 percent of the country's population and the
largest share of the nation's welfare caseload (20%). Finally, the
findings from this study may be of special value to other states
since California's policies play a vital role in affecting nationwide
welfare legislation. Thus, the results of this study are interesting
not only for what they can tell us about the effects of welfare
reform in California but they may also serve as a template for
similar research in other states.
Welfare Policy Initiatives in the 1990s:
The California Experience
The Waivers
From 1993 until the passage of the PRWOA in 1996, waivers
were granted to California by the federal government. The waivers that would be expected to have the greatest impact on families'
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decisions to enter or leave welfare would be those that provided
recipients with work incentives or those that reduced the maximum benefit levels that a family could receive during the month.
Both of these waivers were implemented statewide and both
were intended to impact a greater number of families than other
waivers. Under the waiver designed to provide work incentives,
California extended the $30 and 1/3 disregards for as long as
the recipients retained employment. Prior to the implementation
of this waiver, under the federal time limit, the first $30.00 and
then 1/3 of the rest of recipients' wages were disregarded when
calculating their welfare grants during the first four months of
work, after which time only the $30.00 disregard applied. The
waiver that reduced benefit levels was motivated by the idea that
families are more likely to gain employment if the welfare system
was made less attractive. In turn, maximum benefit levels were
reduced for families by 2.7 percent.
CalWORKs
California's response to the federal welfare reform, the
PRWOA, was CalWORKs. The Welfare to Work Act of 1997,
AB1542, established welfare reform in California. The new AFDC
program in California, CalWORKs, was implemented statewide
in January 1998 (California Department of Social Services, 1998).
One of the major objectives of CalWORKs is to encourage economic self-sufficiency through work incentives and paid employment with minimal government involvement. CalWORKs also
encourages job readiness, two parent families and reduction of
unplanned pregnancies. The CalWORKs legislation substantially
modified the financial incentives used in the AFDC program by
permitting working recipients to keep a greater share of their
earnings. CalWORKs did away with the $30.00 and 1/3 income
disregard that existed earlier and replaced them with a $225.00
and 1/2 disregards. Under CalWORKs, welfare benefits are limited to adult recipients for a lifetime maximum of 5 years (California Department of Social Services, 1998).
Implicationsfor Welfare Accessions
In general, CalWORKs' major provisions are considerably
different from ones found under earlier 1990s policy initiatives.
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Earlier work requirements under the waivers were not as stringent as the ones found under CalWORKs and welfare was not
defined as a transitional program. Consequently, it is expected
that the effects of California's welfare policies on the decisions
of families to enter welfare would be different before and after
the inception of PRWOA in 1998. It also would be expected that
some CalWORKs requirements would deter more of the eligible
population from applying for welfare than would have been the
case in earlier years. Some families may be saving up their five
welfare years. Since the economy also had changed drastically in
California during the Waiver and CalWORKs periods, the effects
of welfare policies are intertwined with those of the economy.
These effects will be teased apart in the empirical portion of
the study.
California's Economy and Welfare Accessions
As many other states, the State of California experienced
a major recession which began in 1990 and lasted until 1995.
The 1990s economic recovery coincided with fewer number of
families on welfare. California's economic downturn in the early
1990s was severe in comparison to the downturns experienced
by many other states. From January 1990 to January 1993, the
number of unemployed in California nearly doubled from 750,000
to 1.4 million. California fared well in the earlier months of the
recession, but later on its economy was the weakest in the nation
(Congressional Budget Office, 1993).
The 1990s recession hit the employment levels in the service
industries particularly hard, a service sector that frequently offers
employment opportunities to female-headed families (Congressional Budget Office, 1993). On the flip side of the coin, economic
recovery in California was quite good, offering many employment opportunities to those in the service sector. Both of the sharp
economic changes in California in the 1990s offer a good opportunity for studying the impact of the economy on the number of
families entering the welfare system.
Calculations revealed that California's unemployment rate
increased by about 60 percent from 1990 to 1993. During this
time period, the percent of the eligible population participating
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in the single-parent program component of the AFDC system
also increased by about 25 percent and the percentage of those
leaving this program had decreased by slightly more than three
percent. Thus, the caseload grew in the height of the recession
partially because accession rates increased substantially. By 1998,
the unemployment rate reverted back to its pre-recessionary level
of about 6 percent. Similarly by 1998, entry rates reverted back to
their early 1990 rate of about one-half percentage points. It would
be unwise, however, to attribute the entire rise or fall in welfare
case openings to recession or recovery or any other single factor.
Without controlling for other factors which may affect changes in
welfare accessions, the effects of the economy or welfare policies
on these components of caseload can not be estimated for sure.
Explaining Recent Changes in Welfare Caseloads:
The Literature
The literature discussed in the following sections is macro in
orientation because the present study is conducted on a macrolevel. The review examines literature that explains growth in
entire caseloads or literature that examines changes in their components.
Studies explaining decline in welfare caseloads
Over the last two decades, the greatest number of studies
which explained changes in the size of welfare caseload have
been for select states or major metropolitan cities (Albert, 2000;
Albert & King, 1999; Albert, 1988; Barnow, 1988; Brazzell, Lefberg,
& Wolfgang 1989; Garsky, 1990; Klerman & Hader, 2000; Mueser,
Hotchkiss, King, Rokicki & Stevens, 2000; O'Neill, 1990; Plotnick
& Lidman, 1987; Scholl & Stapleford,1991; Wedel, 1987). In recent
years, when welfare caseloads have taken a plunge nationwide,
several studies aimed to explain this decline (Albert, 2000; Blank,
1997; Council of Economic Advisors 1997; Klerman & Hader, 2000;
Mueser, Hotchkiss, King, Rokicki & Stevens, 2000; Ziliak, Figlio,
Davis & Connelly, 1997).
The majority of these studies explain the decline in total
caseloads rather than changes in case openings or closings. Many
of these studies attribute a sizable percent of the decline to economic conditions. For instance, Council of Economic Advisors

Future Reforms

11

(CEA) (1997) attributed 44 percent of the decline in the caseload
from 1993 to 1996 to economic conditions and 31 percent to
waivers granted by federal government. Others such as Ziliak,
Figlio, Davis & Connelly (1998), for example, attributed nearly
two-thirds of the same decline to economic conditions and almost
nothing to the waivers. A recent study conducted for California
used administrative data to determine caseload decline (Klerman
and Haider, 2000). Economic conditions were the main factors
used to explain caseload flows. The study revealed that over
50 percent of the decline in the caseload in California could be
explained by economic factors. Finally, Blank's (1997) study maintained that the economy played an important role in shaping the
national caseload in recent years, but that other factors including
waivers and demographics also were major factors.
Three of the above studies were conducted on a national
rather than state or local level (Blank 1997; CEA 1997; Ziliak,
Figlio, Davis & Connelly, 1998). This is a shortcoming since large
state-to-state variations exist in regard to welfare benefit levels
and in regard to economic conditions. Two of the studies used
annual data (Blank,1997; CEA, 1997). When annual or even quarterly data are used, the short-run dynamics in caseload levels
are ignored. Not all of these studies accounted for variables that
are justifiable on a theoretical basis or variables that traditionally
have been included in models of this sort. Some researchers did
not include measures of the gains from welfare, which typically
are the welfare benefits versus a measure of the gains from work,
such as wages (Council of Economic Advisors, 1996; Klerman and
Haider, 2000; Ziliak et al., 1997). Finally, all researchers tackled
with the problem of specifying the effects of the waivers that were
granted by the federal government to the states prior to the inception the PRWOA. Some waivers were implemented statewide and
others in only a part of a given state. Ziliak et al., (1997) maintain
that only statewide effects should be captured. Along the same
lines, the date which best captures the presence of a waiver poses
difficulties. The Council of Economic Advisors' model included
waiver application date rather than approval dates (1996). Since in
some states a long time elapsed between the time the state applied
for a waiver and the actual approval date, the approval rather than
the application date should be integrated into the model.
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All in all, to date, very few studies attempted to explain the rise
and fall of the welfare caseloads in the 1990s. The extent to which
the economy played a major role in decreasing the caseloads is
mixed from existing evidence. Many of these studies suffer from
several limitations, including using annual data and not including
theoretically driven variables. Most of these studies' findings,
therefore, should be viewed with caution.
Studies explaining aggregatemovements
In contrast to most recent aggregate findings, one recent study
aimed to explain the role of these factors on the decision of
families to move to or from welfare and found that welfare policy, rather than the economy played major factor in explaining
these decisions ( Mueser, Hotchkiss, King, Rokicki & Stevens,
2000). This study used quarterly data on recipients in five major
urban areas to examine the impact of 1990s reform on welfare
entries and exits. Their findings revealed that in these particular
areas, policy changes were the primary reasons for the changes in
welfare entries and exists, with economic conditions playing secondary importance. Since many important variables, including
benefit levels and eligibility criteria were not controlled for in the
study's models, the findings of these studies should be viewed
with caution.
Studies regarding case openings and closings prior to recent
welfare reform showed that the impact of welfare policy and
economy on the decision to enter is different from its impact on the
decision to leave. Some earlier studies are available, which shed
light on the differential impact of mandatory employment programs on aggregate movements to and from the welfare system.
For example, Schiller and Brasher (1993) estimated the effect of
workfare in Ohio, a mandatory employment program requiring
participants to work for their benefits, on welfare openings and
closings by using both cross sectional and time series data. Their
findings revealed that, all else constant, the impact of Ohio's
workfare program on terminations were fairly large but that
applications failed to decline in the presence of the program.
Other studies, as for example, Phillip's (1993) study in California measured the impact of the Greater Avenues for Independence Now (GAIN) program solely on welfare accessions.
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The impact of GAIN was measured prior to the inception of the
Waivers California received from the federal government. Phillips
used both panel and time series data to determine GAIN's effects.
Phillip's study also showed that welfare case openings did not
change much in the presence of the GAIN program. A more recent
study by Albert and King (1999) showed that the effects of GAIN
on welfare terminations in California also were quite modest.
Their study showed the effects of the economy were significant
in shaping welfare terminations.
All in all, some evidence demonstrates that the effects of welfare initiatives are different for those families deciding to enter the
system as opposed to those deciding to leave the system. Models
for entry need to be specified differently than those for exit. Unlike
experimental designs, aggregate time-series analysis allows for
the determination of the extent to which the potentially eligible
population reacts to social policy. The extent to which welfare
reform initiatives in the 1990s had effected case openings is a question that has not been well investigated. Studies prior to welfare
reform, however, teach us valuable lessons about how to model
welfare entries. These lessons are followed in the present study.
Modeling Entries to TANF
Time-series analysis is used to analyze data, which occur
sequentially over time such as monthly welfare entries in the
present study. Much like cross-sectional regression analysis, timeseries analysis often uses a set of explanatory variables as determinants of a dependent time-series variable. Unlike cross-sectional
regression analysis, when trying to determine the functional relationship between the dependent and independent time-series
explanatory variables, one often lags some of the explanatory
variables. Typically, this is done when an explanatory variable is
expected to have a delayed or lingering effect on the dependent
variable. For example, a decrease in employment opportunities in
the market place, captured by the number of unemployed, would
not necessarily have an immediate effect on welfare accessions.
Often it takes a while for welfare recipients to turn to welfare after
becoming unemployed. In time-series analysis the total impact
of the lagged coefficients is calculated together and F-tests are
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performed. In the case of the present study, multiple lags were
not used and the coefficient of each lag can viewed in the same
way as the coefficient of each non-lagged variables.
The modeling efforts in this study focus on specifying an
equation that examines the effects of welfare policies and the
economy on welfare case openings. The equation is for the single parent component of the AFDC/CalWORKs program from
January 1983 to December 1998. The beginning date is January
1983 because by this time the sharp changes in the caseload due
to Reagan's Administration Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) policies in 1981 dissipated and the caseload returned to
its pre-OBRA levels. The idea underlying the equation is that
over the study period, month-to-month changes in the number
of welfare families entering welfare are in response to changes in
welfare policies and to changes in demographics, programmatic
or economic factors shown in earlier research to have an effect on
case openings. The independent factors for each of the equation
are listed below.
Welfare Entries
AC(t) = bo + b, TP(t) + b 2 TOTFEM(t) + b 3 WAIVERs(t) +
b 4 CaLWORKs(t) + b5 MW(t-1) + b 6 UNEMP (t-1) +
b 7 TOTCLOSE (t-1) + b8 JA(t) +..... +
b18 NV(t) + e(t)
for any t 1 where t = number of months from January 1983,
AC(t) = number of families entering welfare (accessions)
during month t,
TP(t) = total payments of AFDC/CalWORKs maximum
aid and food stamps for a family of three,
deflated by the CNI (1998 = 100), at month t,
TOTFEM(t) = total number of females of child bearing age, 15
to 44, in the general population excluding those
on welfare, at month t.
WAIVERS(t) = a dummy variable representing welfare waivers
beginning in September 1993, at month t.
CalWORKs(t) = California's welfare reform program under
PRWOA which began in January 1998, at
month t.
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MW(t) = full-time minimum wage gross earnings,
deflated by the CPI-W (6/1998 = 100) at
month t,
UNEMP(t) = number of unemployed individuals in
California during month t,
TOTCLOSE (t) = the total number of cases closed or terminated
during month t,
e(t) = random error term at t.
For variable sources, construction and deflation see Appendix A.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable represents the number of cases added
during any given month. This consists of those families who have
not been on welfare for at least one year and those who have
returned within one year. In this analysis, these two types of
additions are lumped together as cases added or accessions (AC).
Demographicand Caseload Variables
Demographics.Welfare accessions are hypothesized to be a linear function of the size of the potentially eligible population or the
population at risk of receiving welfare. Defining this population
poses a serious problem since potential welfare cases include
those categorically eligible households that are poor and those
households that are neither categorically eligible nor poor but
have the potential of becoming both. For this study, the number
of females age 15 to 44 in the population not already heading
welfare families is selected to be the population at risk (TOTFEM).
These females are of child-bearing age. This is the population
group that is most likely to be an AFDC-FG/CalWORKs female
household head. It is expected that, all else constant, the number
of potentially eligible population would vary positively with the
number of cases added.
Closures. Including the number of cases terminated (TOTCLOSE) as a predictor variable is warranted because recent welfare participants have some knowledge about welfare regulations
and experience less difficulty with application process than other
applicants do. A single month lag structure is incorporated into
the accessions equation because it is assumed that some cases
return to welfare soon after they leave.
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ProgrammaticVariables
Total payments. According to economic theory, individuals
choose between benefits available to them from incomemaintenance programs and those available to them in the marketplace, such as wages. Available evidence strongly suggests that
increases in welfare payments, all else constant, increase welfare
entries, decrease welfare exits and in turn increase the total welfare caseload. (Albert, 1988; Albert & King, 1999; Hutchens, 1981;
Plotnick & Lidman, 1987 ). Therefore, all else constant, assuming
individuals choose to maximize their income, individuals will
choose welfare over work as welfare benefits (TP) increase. In the
present study, combined welfare benefits include both AFDCFG/CalWORKs and Food Stamp benefits since recipients' purchasing power is best captured when both benefits are included.
In real terms, over the study period, maximum aid plus Food
Stamp benefits for a family of three decreased by $1.11 per month.
This decrease occurred partially because maximum aid was cut in
absolute terms and partially because benefit levels did not keep
up with inflation.
Waivers and CalWORKs. In earlier studies, policy initiatives
are typically captured by a dummy variable (Albert, 1988; Albert
& King, 1999; June O'Neill, 1990). In this study, a set of dummy
variables are incorporated into the case opening equation. One
dummy variable takes a value of 1 in all months from September
1993 until December 1997, capturing the provision which allowed
California to extend the $30.00 and 1/ 3 disregards beyond the first
four months of work. It also captures the effects of other waivers
received during the same time period, including those which
expanded the work related services and emphasized parental
responsibility (WAIVERS). The second dummy variable in the
accessions equation begins in January 1998 when CalWORKs was
implemented in California.
The hypothesized effect of the waivers or CalWORKs on
case openings is indeterminate. Welfare reform policies in the
1990s may have deterred some eligible families from applying
for welfare, resulting in fewer case openings. Clearly, as will be
done in the present study, the effects of economic recovery in
recent years also need to be accounted for in order to isolate these
effects from those of welfare policies.
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Economic Variables

Wages. The variable representing monthly gross earnings from
full-time minimum wage (MW) employment is incorporated into
the equation. This variable represents the minimal standard of
living provided by full-time employment in the private economy.
Controlling for inflation, on average, minimum wage from fulltime employment increased by about $0.26 per month during the
study period. The evidence from past research regarding the effect
of this variable on case openings is mixed (Albert, 1988; Albert
& King 1999; O'Neill, 1990). In this study, all else constant, this
variable is hypothesized to vary negatively with the number of
welfare additions.
Unemployment. Aside from wages, the decision to enter or
leave welfare depends on other choices or opportunities available
to welfare participants in the labor market (Albert, 1988; Albert
& King, 1999). Typically, the measures used to capture the effect
of the business cycle on additions or terminations include either
unemployment or employment levels. In the present study, the
unemployment variable (UNEMP) is lagged and integrated into
the accessions equation in order to account for a delayed response
on the part of individuals for entering welfare as a result of
changes in labor market conditions. It is expected that, all else
constant, this variable is positively related to the number of people
entering welfare during the month.
CaseloadVariables.A variable capturing the number of families
who left in the previous month is incorporated in the equation. If
this variable is positive and statistically significant, then a number
of those who left the rolls last month return soon after. Incorporating as independent variables the number of cases closed captures
turnover in the caseload. Finally, seasonals are incorporated into
the equation. It is expected that seasonal variables aside from
those already incorporated into the equation would also be associated with the number of families entering each month.
Calculating and Interpreting the Time Series Equation
The study period consists of 16 years, totaling 192 months of
data. Prior to estimating any coefficients in the equation, there are
192 degrees of freedom. For each of the 192 months during the
study period, there are data about each variable in the equation.
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For example, during January 1983, there is information about the
number of families entering welfare (AC), the maximum total
monetary value of AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp payments a
family of three receives (TP), the total number of families of child
bearing age and so forth. There are 11 month variables in the
equation, representing seasonal fluctuation that also can affect
the number of families entering welfare. These seasonals are
treated as independent variables (January through November).
The variable January, an independent variable, representing a
seasonal trend is given the value of 1 during all months of January
present in the study period and the value of 0 during the other
months. Similarly,when February occurs during the study period,
the independent variable February is given the value 1 and the
value of 0 during the other months. There are 11 rather 12 months
representing seasonal fluctuations because in regression analysis there can be no linear combination of independent variables
equaling a constant. The sum of the 12 monthly variables would
always equal one.
Along the same lines as the seasonal variables, there are
two variables representing policy changes: WAIVERS and CalWORKS. Prior to the presence of the WAIVERS, September 1993,
all values for this variable equal zero. From September 1993 until
the passage of CalWORKs in January 1998, the variable WAIVERS
is assigned the value of 1. Similarly, prior to January 1998, the
variable CalWORKS has value 0, because the policy was not in
existence. From January 1998 onward, the value 1 is taken because
welfare reform policies were in effect.
In calculating the effects of each independent variable on the
dependent variable, total number of families entering welfare, all
study months are considered in the equation and coefficients are
estimated along with their corresponding t-statistic. The meaning
of the coefficients of each independent variable is the same as it is
in any cross-sectional linear regression equation. Each coefficient
of an independent variable represents the average amount of
change in the dependent variable associated with a unit change
in the independent variable, all other independent variables held
constant. For example, the coefficient of the total payments variable (TP) estimates that for each dollar increase in total payments
approximately 33 additional monthly accessions is associated
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with that independent variable. For each non-seasonal dummy
variable, its coefficient estimates on average the effect of a particular policy on accessions, all other independent variables held
constant. For example, the coefficient of CalWORKS estimates
that this policy was associated with an average of 1,724 fewer
families entering welfare during each month that the policy was
in effect.
Frequently, the impact of seasonal trends is not discussed
since such trends may be proxies for the effects of other variables not in the model. If examined, the impact of the seasonal
trends, January through November, needs to be viewed together.
A change in accessions in January, for example, needs to be
viewed in the context of changes in accessions in the other months.
Each monthly variable measures, over the study period, the average increase in accessions associated with the particular month,
all other independent variables constant. For example, in January
the model estimates that on average there were 3,424 fewer accessions that were not explained by the other independent variables
in the model.
Finally, auto-correlation of the residual error term is often
present in time-series. If autocorrelation is present, the standard
error of estimate of the regression coefficients tend to be under
or over estimated, resulting in the value of the coefficient being unreliable. This could lead to spurious significance or nonsignificance of the coefficients. It is, however, often possible to
model the autocorrelation of the error terms, correcting for their
autocorrelation. This results in a much more accurate estimate of
the coefficients and their standard error of estimate. In this study
there was no need to correct for autocorrelation.
Key Findings
Table 1 shows the results for the time-series equation. Findings
reveal that the model performed well. The equation explains over
91 percent of the variance in monthly case openings. Over the
study period, the standard error of estimate is 5.1 percent of the
mean monthly number of accessions. The Durbin-Watson test
statistic for autocorrelation of the error term suggests that there
is no first order serial correlation at the 5 percent level.
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Table 1
Time Series Results for Accessions
ACCESSIONS
Variable

Lag

Coefficient

Constant

-

-70810

(-7.043)**

Total Payments
TotFem
Waivers

0
0
0

33.41
0.00808
403.7

(4.496)**
(14.34)**
(0.5551)

CaIWORKs
MW
Unemployment

0
1
1

-1724
-5.108
0.00808

(-2.181)**
(-1.830)**
(12.11)**

Terminations
January

1
0

0.4627
-3424

(5.931)**
(-5.812)**

February
March

0
0

1046
-1053

(1.771)
(-1.793)

April

0

-245.6

(-0.4141)

May

0

-2173

(-3.521)**

June

0

-1668

(-2.822)**

July

0

-2117

(-3.530)**

August
September
October

0
0
0

-3082
502.5
-3484

(-5.174)**
(0.8162)
(-5.655)**

November

0

-627.4

(-1.024)

ADJ R

2

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Durbin-Watson .......

(t stat)

0.91

2.22

Note: ** Variable's coefficient is statistically significant (p < .05).
Sources, definitions and deflation: See Appendix A

ProgrammaticVariables
Total payments. Table 1 reveals that total payments (TP) has the
expected signs and is statistically significant (p < 0.05). All else
equal, a $10.00 increase in total payments is estimated to increase
the number of new families entering welfare by 334, or about 1
percent of total additions. These results are consistent with earlier
research (Albert, 1988; Albert & King, 1999).

FutureReforms

21

Waivers and CalWORKs. Any interpretation of the effects of
the Waivers granted to California from 1993 to 1997 should be
viewed with extreme caution since the coefficient of the Waiver
variable is found to be statistically insignificant. In contrast, under the PRWOA, in 1998, the impact of the CalWORKs on the
number of families entering welfare was statistically significant
and negative. On average, all else constant, under the presence of
CalWORKs, the number of cases added to the caseload decreased
by about 1724 cases per month or about 5 percent of total additions
(p < .005).
Economic Variables
Wages. The effect of minimum wage on number of families
entering welfare is as hypothesized and statistically significant at
the .06 level. From January 1990 to January 1993, real minimum
wage from full-time earnings decreased by $2.80 per month. The
findings suggest that a decrease in real minimum wage of $2.80
per month results in 14 more families entering the welfare rolls.
Unemployment. The unemployment rate in California increased from 5.6 percent in January 1990 to 10.3 percent at the
height of the recession which occurred in January 1993. During
this time period, the number unemployed in California increased
by 20,400 people per month. The extent to which the economy
affected the decision to enter welfare is captured in this study by
the unemployment variable. The unemployment variable is statistically significant (p < .005). Calculations reveal that an increase
of 20,400 in the number of unemployed suggests an increase of
165 more cases added to the rolls each month. The net impact of
policies and the economy on welfare entries is further analyzed
in the forecasting section.
CaseloadVariables.A variable capturing the number of families
who left in the previous month is incorporated into the equation.
The coefficient of this variable suggests that as the number of families that left last month increases by 1,000, the number of families
entering this month increases by 462 families. This variable is
statistically significant (p < .05). This finding suggests that some
of those leaving the rolls return soon, perhaps due to personal
.circumstances or a corrected administrative error.
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Forecasting the Impact of Policy Shifts and Unemployment
With a good model in hand, it is possible to forecast the
consequences for accessions under alternative assumptions about
external developments. In order to engage in such forecasting
exercises, the dummy variables, waivers and CalWORKs were
turned off. The forecasting exercises allows for the determination
of the net impact of the policy shifts under CalWORKs and of
recovering economy on accessions.
The impact of policies. As Table 1 reveals, any interpretation of
the effects of the waivers granted by the federal government to
California needs to be viewed with caution since the coefficient
is statistically insignificant. It is safe to say, however, that the
effects of the welfare policies on case openings when waivers
were granted to California probably were not large. Given these
results, no forecasting exercise was performed to determine the
impact of Waivers on welfare entries.
Since the coefficient of CalWORKs was found to be statistically significant, a forecast of the effects of CalWORKs on accessions is performed. This exercise reveals that in 1998, CalWORKs
was associated with about 1,930 fewer families entering welfare,
about 5 percent per month.
The impact of unemployment. In order to estimate the effect of
unemployment on accessions, the accession equation is used to
determine what the number of families entering welfare would
have been had the economy not improved. Assuming unemployment level had remained high, monthly accessions were
simulated from the time the Waiver policies were implemented
in September 1993 through the implementation of CalWORKs to
the end of 1998. The model estimates that the recovering economy
was associated with about 2,120 fewer case openings, which is a
decrease of about 6 percent families entering welfare per month.
Summary & Future Directions
The study's findings showed that in California, in 1998, the
PRWOA had effected the potentially eligible population's decision to enter the welfare system. This may have occurred because
CalWORKs provisions deterred some families from entering welfare. Perhaps some families wanted to save their 5 year limit or
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did not want to participate in a system that has very stringent
work requirements. While very recent welfare reforms under
the PRWOA are associated with fewer families entering welfare,
previous research had demonstrated that this legislation, at least
a year after its inception, was not associated with a lower caseload
(Albert, 2000). Since the size of the entire caseload is a function of
both welfare case openings and closings, the caseload probably
did not decrease because welfare policy shifts under CalWORKs
were not associated with fewer terminations.
Overall, this study's findings and others have highlighted the
importance of considering how the economy effects the behaviors
of families that turn to TANE This paper demonstrated that under
favorable economic conditions, fewer families choose to apply for
welfare. In the 1990s, the impact of the economy on welfare entries
may have been particularly pronounced in California because job
opportunities in the service industry, an industry that frequently
employs welfare recipients, declined substantially during the
1990s recession and increased sharply during the state's economic
recovery.
Because the economy played such a major role in the decision
of families to enter the welfare system, states need to consider that
role when designing future welfare policies. Drastic measures
such as time-limited welfare may not be necessary. States and
the federal government can re-evaluate the overall purpose and
design of the federally imposed time-limits for welfare benefits.
A favorable economic environment allows many recipients to
remain off public assistance without the presence of time-limited
welfare as was the case prior to welfare reform of 1996. Policy
makers need to pay particular attention to the fraction of the
caseload that does not leave during economic upturns.
State policy makers need to re-think their long-term strategies
of helping those with the greatest employment barriers, and assist
many recipients in gaining employment that allows them to be
economically self-sufficient. Nationwide, policy makers are confronted with what might happen to many welfare families when
the inevitable downturn in the economy occurs. A downturn
in the economy may occur around the same time that federal
time-limits are in effect for some families on welfare. During
such times, federal and state policy makers may need to relax the

24

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

federal time-limits to more than 60 months or possibly increase
the fraction of the caseload who can be exempted from time
limits. This is similar to what has been done with Unemployment
Insurance in recessionary periods.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions, Construction and Sources
AC(t) = The number families entering Aid to Families
with Dependent Children-Family Group/
CaIWORKs during the month. Such data
were provided by the California Health and
Welfare Agency, Department of Social Services,
Statistical Services Branch, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children-CashGrant Caseload
Movement and ExpendituresReport, Sacramento.
TOTCLOSE(t) = The total number of cases closed or
terminated during the month from Aid to
Families with Dependent Children-Family
Group/CalWORKs. Such data were provided
by the California Health and Welfare Agency,
Department of Social Services, Statistical
Services Branch, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children-Cash Grant CaseloadMovement and
Expenditures Report, Sacramento.
TOTFEM(t) = Annual demographic data were provided by the
California Department of Finance, Population
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Research Unit. Yearly demographic data were
interpolated to monthly values.
TP(t) = total payments, or AFDC plus food stamp
benefits for a family of three (t) deflated by the
California Necessities Index (CNI) 1998=100.
AFDC maximum aid values were provided
by California Health and Welfare Agency,
Department of Social Services, Statistical
Services Branch, Sacramento. Food stamp
benefits were calculated by using Thrifty Food
Plan amounts allotted to a family of three.
Thrifty Food Plan values were provided by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and
Nutrition Services, Washington, D.C.
WAIVERS(t) = welfare waivers are represented by a dummy
variable, beginning in September 1993, at
month t.
CalWORKs(t) = California's welfare reform program under
PRWOA which began in January 1998, at
month t.
MW(t) = gross earnings from full-time minimum wage
employment at t, deflated by the CPI-W,
6/1998=100. The data were provided by the
State of California, Department of Industrial
Relations, Industrial Welfare Commission, San
Francisco.
UNEMP(t) = seasonally unadjusted number of unemployed.
Numbers were provided by the California
Employment Development Department, Report
LF101, Employment Data and Research Division
Estimates, Economic Research Group.
CPI-W(t) = California Consumer Price Index for Urban
Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (t). This is a
measure of the average change in prices of fixed
market basket of goods. It is based on the costs of
food, clothing, shelter, transportation and other
day-to-day living expenses. Data for the CPI
were provided by the California Department of
Finance, Financial Research Unit, Sacramento.
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CNI(t) = California Necessities Index (t). This measure
of price changes for selected components of the
CPI follows changes in the prices of clothing,
food, fuel, utilities and transportation. It does
not include medical care nor mortgage interest
rates. Data for the CNI were provided by the
California Department of Finance, Financial
Research Unit, Sacramento.

